One of the driving motivations for President Nixon's actions was the perception that growing imbalances between the U.S., with an exploding balance of payments deficit, and Germany and other countries of Western Europe and Japan, with burgeoning surpluses, was harmful to the competitive position of U.S. manufacturing and the country's overall prosperity. President Nixon's New Economic Policy had three principal prongs: closing the gold window to protect the remaining U.S. gold reserves; a ten per cent surcharge on imports of all countries to force the surplus countries to revalue their currencies; and a ninety-day wage price freeze to control U.S. inflation. This paper argues that the key deep underlying fundamental for the growing international imbalances was rising U.S. inflation since 1965, in turn driven by expansionary monetary and fiscal policies-the elephant in the room. What was kept in the background in August 15 1971 was that U.S. inflation, driven by U.S. macro policies, was the main problem facing the Bretton Woods System, and that for political and doctrinal reasons was not directly addressed. Instead President Nixon blamed the rest of the world instead of correcting mistaken U.S. policies. In addition, at the urging of Federal Reserve Chairman Arthur F. Burns, Nixon adopted wage and price controls to mask the inflation, hence punting the problem into the future. Section 4 focuses on the international policy coordination between the US and the other major players in the Bretton Woods system (the G10, the IMF, the BIS) to try to preserve the system. In section 5 we spotlight the actions of three key actors in the US drama of the collapse of BWS whose actions were an important element in the way the political economy of the events played out; Arthur Burns, Paul Volcker and George P. Shultz. Section 6 in conclusion considers some parallels between the events of the crisis of the early 1970s and the current U.S. situation. Unlike the 1960s and 70s monetary policy and inflation is not a serious force pointing to a crisis. But there is some similarity to the 1960s and 1970s in the burgeoning fiscal deficits and a run up in the ratio of debt to GDP consequent upon the resolution of the Great Financial crisis and the recent tax cuts. This may lead to a fiscal crisis and eventually a dollar crisis which has some echoes to the events of 1968 to 1973.
2.Bretton Woods
The Bretton Woods System (BWS) came out of the Bretton Woods conference in 1944.
The adjustable peg system was conceived as a compromise between the fixed exchange rate gold standard and the floating exchange rates of the 1920s ( Bordo 1993 . Its purpose was to optimize the global trading system and yet allow domestic demand management to preserve full employment. It required capital controls and the International Monetary Fund was established to help alleviate short term current account imbalances.
The BWS only became fully operational in December 1958 after the Western European countries declared current account convertibility. The system quickly evolved into a gold dollar standard. The U.S. as center country pegged the dollar into gold at $35 per ounce and the rest of the world pegged their currencies to the dollar.
The U.S. dollar emerged as a key reserve currency for the rest of the world as a substitute for scarce gold. 1 The demand for international reserves grew with the growth of real output and trade and was satisfied by the U.S. running ever larger balance of payments deficits. As center country the U.S did not have to adjust to its balance of payments deficits by pursuing tight financial policies 2 . The dollar was held as international reserves because of its unique properties as an international unit of account, medium of exchange and store of value. The crucial requirement for the system to work was that the US maintain stable monetary and fiscal policies, ie maintain price stability.
In 1960 Robert Triffin pointed out the problem of having one country's currency, the dollar, as the reserve currency for the world (Bordo and McCauley 2018 Keynes's (1943) bancor, Eventually the international community produced SDRs as a form of paper gold. Despres, Kindleberger and Salant(1966) and McKinnon (1969) argued counter to Triffin , that the US was the banker to the rest of the world and a dollar standard could persist as long as the U.S. followed stable macro policies.
Milton Friedman (1953) predicted that the adjustable peg would eventually break down because it depended on capital controls and because the adjustment mechanism both between countries and the rest of the world and the US wouldn't work in the face of downward nominal rigidities and the full employment mandate (Coombs 1976 , Solomon 1982 , Bordo 1993 . These Martin followed a policy of low inflation and the FOMC did pay attention to the US balance of payments and gold reserves in its deliberations (Bordo and Eichengreen 2013) . Europeans complained about US inflation but they were wrong -U.S. inflation adjusted for output growth was below theirs before 1965 (Meltzer 2010) . The French also resented the exorbitant privilege of the dollar and its "adjustment without tears" (Bordo, Monnet and Naif 2017) .
to 1971: Crisis and Collapse
The key driving force for the growing imbalances beginning in 1965 was money The increase in US money growth led to larger US balance of payments deficits (figure 4) and increases in the international reserves of Germany, Japan and other surplus countries (figure 5), in turn putting pressure on them to expand their money supplies and push up prices (Bordo 1993) , This led to increased resentment against the U.S. ;a 10% surcharge on imports and a 90 day wage price freeze. The object of the first two actions was to preserve US gold reserves and to pressure the surplus countries to revalue their currencies. The wage price freeze (which later turned into controls) reflected the belief by Burns and others that inflation was primarily driven by non monetary cost push forces and more fundamentally that the domestic political costs of the correct monetary policy required to really kill inflation was just too high.
The Beginning of the Great Inflation in the U.S.
During World War II the US financed only a small part of wartime expenditures with the inflation tax compared to World War I and much of it was suppressed by price controls (Friedman and Schwartz 1963 ) . During the War the Federal Reserve was subservient to the Treasury and was constrained in its actions by enforcing pegs on both short term and long term government securities. After the war when the controls were lifted inflation jumped, reaching a peak in 1948. The Fed began pressing for a return to its operational independence which was finally achieved in 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 Primary -federal (% of potential GDP) Full-employment (% of potential GDP)
Martin attached considerable importance to cooperating with the administration and his concept of central bank independence was "independent within the government".
As a consequence money growth began increasing along with fiscal deficits. 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 monetary and fiscal policies should be used to fine tune the business cycle ( Stein 1994 Congress also favored low interest rates in this period. 5 The urban legend is that LBJ invited Martin down to his ranch and took him for a rough drive in a jeep when he made the point that Martin should not raise the discount rate in December (which he did anyway) Bordo and Eichengreen 2013, Meltzer 2010) 1960 1962 1964 1966 1968 1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 1982 pressure from the administration to avoid rising unemployment. As a consequence, expansionary monetary (and fiscal policy) would lead to a reduction in unemployment then followed by an increase in inflation. The Fed would then tighten to reduce inflation but once unemployment started increasing political pressure would encourage the Fed to abandon its tightening. According to Meltzer these actions convinced the public that the Fed did not attach high priority to inflation which became more and more persistent as inflationary expectations became embedded in the public conscience 6 . 
Richard Nixon became President in

International Policy Considerations
The Bretton Woods system was designed as a cooperative exercise and the IMF was established to coordinate international and domestic macro policies of all the members. As described in Bordo and Schenk (2017) 
Key Players in the Drama
Three US officials (other than Richard Nixon and John Connally) were key players in the drama of the collapse of the Bretton Woods system: Arthur Burns, Paul Volcker and George P Shultz.
Arthur Burns was the villain of the play because of his about face in 1970 on inflation.
By rejecting the role of monetary forces and advocating wage price controls he had considerable responsibility for the Great Inflation of the 1970s 10 . He also was a continued advocate for pegged exchange rates and an opponent of floating. Before 10 Milton Friedman was very pleased at Burns's appointment to the Federal Reserve Chairmanship. He expected that he would follow through with a gradualist rules based monetary strategy. When Burns changed his views and became an advocate of wage price controls and an opponent of the monetary approach to inflation Friedman was very upset and was highly critical of his former mentor for many years. In another letter to Robert Leeson on May 11 1994, Friedman wrote "It is interesting that you present Arthur Burns as the key opponent of inflation policies at the time (the 1960s), and that is certainly correct. However it is ironic that in the 1970s, particularly 1971, he bears considerable responsibility for the adoption of price and wage control, and accordingly for the subsequent inflation that it unleashed. This was when he was chairman of the Federal Reserve Board. He gave a speech in early 1971 essentially defending "voluntary price and wage control, something which was precisely what was precisely the opposite of what he urged long before. I say this with sadness since Arthur Burns was unquestionably the single most important professional mentor I had to whom I was extremely close as a student, as a colleague, and as a friend." "You give George Shultz much credit, and he fully deserves it and more. He has a fine mind and an even more unusual character. What impressed me most about himunder both Nixon and Reagan is that in dealing with a problem, his first step is to consider long-term consequences and only then ask how various short time measures will contribute to the desirable long term outcome"
The major problem in the US and the rest of the world in the 1960s and 1970s was inflation. That is not the case today although it could be if the Fed is too slow to tighten. Rather the key problem today is fiscal. Like the 1960s and 70s the source of the problem was a run up in fiscal deficits beginning in 1965 and continuing through the 1970s. In recent years major fiscal expansion to stem the Great Recession and a significant run up in the debt to GDP ratio has not been rolled back. The recent tax cuts have increased the fiscal imbalance and are raising the debt ratio into historically high levels. As the Fed tightens to normalize monetary policy and were inflation to pick up much beyond the 2% level, debt service costs will rise which will add to the fiscal imbalances. Aggravating the problem are entitlements that cannot be cut. This means that the room for a fiscal consolidation without an increase in fiscal space could move the US in the direction of a debt crisis. (Slok 2018) . This is a different imbalance than in the 60s and 70s but is still a serious one. Indeed a sovereign debt crisis would threaten the credibility of the dollar as an international currency (Eichengreen 2010) .
A second source of resonance from the earlier crisis is the use of tariff protection. At Camp David the 10 % temporary import surcharge was imposed as a strategic bargaining tool to force the surplus countries to adjust. It was successful in leading to the Smithsonian agreement but in the end the only solution to the problem of the imbalances of the BWS was floating exchange rates. Today the use of tariffs as a threat to force trading partners (especially China) to change their industrial policies risks the same kind of reaction that ultimately made the Camp David strategy fail in the sense that the Smithsonian Agreement only lasted several months as the underlying
